Introduction
The power and governance structure in companies is one of research streams in management theory.
A hypothesis, that has already been partially proved by empirical research, states that "the underlying cause of a crisis situation in a company is th e weakness of ownership supervision, especially in suffi cient autonomy of the supervisory board" (Jeżak 2010 , pp. 51-63).
The existing research shows a direct relationship between "the level of supervisory board's self-reliance and company performance -the more independent the board, the higher the quality of management and the better company performance" (Daily and Dalton 1994, p. 646) . According to general assumptions of the corporate governance theory the primary task of supervisory board (board of directors) is "assess ment of actions taken by members of the board, evaluation of their management skills and their input into meeting shareholders' expectations" (Urbanek 2005 , p. 301). Vol.19 
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This article will be showcasing a classic and modern approach to the role of supervisory boards in the process of effi ciency improvement in companies. The article is based on analysis of the most cited literature approaches regarding this subject.
Classical approach to the role of supervisory board in the management process
Corporate governance can be defi ned in many ways. In the most basic understanding corporate governance is the sum of management and supervision rules for international enterprises (corporations). Statutory (formal) authorities Vol.19 in joint-stock companies (vast majority of international enterprises takes the form of joint-stock companies) consist of three bodies: general meeting of shareholders, supervisory board, and management board. That is further illustrated on fi gure 1.
It can be assumed that the general meeting is the legislative body, supervisory board the controlling body, and the management board the executive body.
The functioning of Supervisory Boards arouses the most controversy. Traditionally, the basic task of a Supervisory Board "is constant supervision over the activities of a company in all the areas of its activity. At the same time, the Supervisory Board does not have any authority over the manner in which the management board is operating. Its core duties are: verifi cation of fi nancial statements with account books, documents, and with factual circumstances; evaluation of management board's motions on profi t or loss distribution; compiling a written report on the results of these evaluations and presenting it on the annual general meeting" (Jeżak 2010, p. 55).
The Supervisory Board can appoint and dismiss (or suspend rights of) management board's members by determining the number of board members, their working conditions, scope of duties and responsibilities.
Thus, it can be stated that in the traditional understanding the Supervisory Board has two main functions: instituting function and supervisory function.
Modern concepts of board functioning in corporate governance
The currently promoted so-called modifi ed approach states that expanding the authority and competencies (scope of duties) of the Supervisory Board is crucial to maintaining its effi ciency, especially in regard to preventing (diagnosing) and overcoming crisis situations.
E. Gutenberg (1980) points to the following Supervisory Board functions:
Such a signifi cant expansion of Supervisory Board's functions aims to put into use to the fullest extent board's members' intellectual potential, that is their qualifi cations, experiences and skills. Especial emphasis is being put on the following new tasks of supervisory boards: yearly evaluations of the company's situation (economic, fi nancial, market, and organisational); identifying potential Vol.19, No. 2 BEATA GLINKOWSKA BOGUSŁAW KACZMAREK threats to the current market position and ways to prevent these threats. The Supervisory Board elected by the General Meeting as a representation for all shareholders -the source of company's fi nancial capital -should primarily analyse and evaluate the way said capital is used and how it translates into positive economic and fi nancial results of the company.
At the same time the Supervisory Board should be also presenting the General Meeting an analysis of the so-called non-fi nancial factors such as: product life-cycle (i.e. level of product renewal), talent management, development of information and communication technologies systems, motivating systems and their relation with work quality, relationship marketing -contact with suppliers, customers, cooperants, and key stakeholders. J. Jeżak states that "(…) only the sum of fi nancial and non-fi nancial factors can be the basis for evaluation of company's well-being by the supervisory board" (Jeżak 2010, p. 62 ).
Theoretical and model concepts on corporate governance based on practical research are very interesting, especially when confronted with economic reality. They are not derived from management but from institutional economics. These concepts are: agency theory and stewardship theory. In the most basic understanding, they describe the behaviours of managers -members of supervisory boards -and the role of supervisory boards in relation to the management board of a company. The most important aspects emphasized by the agency theory and stewardship theory are shown on tab. 1. 
Source: own work
The "philosophy" characteristics of stewardship theory and agency theory in corporate governance are juxtaposed on tab. 2.
It may seem that both agency theory and stewardship theory are derived from different concepts of a "model person". In agency theory we are presented with a rational individual that by furthering their own interests is aiming to maximise own usefulness.
The stewardship theory seems to be strongly rooted in organisational psychology and sociology, especially in McGregor's Theory Y. In 1960, McGregor presented two opposite approaches of managers to employees. These approaches were named Theory X and Theory Y. They are describing the way employees are perceived by managers 1 . Stewardship theory is focusing on managerial behaviour. It states that the key motivating factor for managers is getting satisfaction from a job well done. Thus, their behaviour is pro-organisational and in line with organisation's interests. There is no confl ict between managers and shareholders. That confl ict in turn is the essence of the problems described by the agency theory. When it comes to the functions of supervisory boards in companies, the agency theory puts emphasis on constant monitoring of management board's activities, whereas in the stewardship theory the primary function of the supervisory board in relation to the management board is to lend support, give advice, share experience and skills.
What is the biggest difference between these two theories? It is the approach to motivation. In agency theory, "agent" motivators are solely fi nancial. This is mainly a result of the necessity to align agent behaviour with shareholders' interests. That is why manager's owning shares of the company is a chief motivator. That is a component of the company's costs! The stewardship theory states that there is no need to implement "costly" motivators. The so-called "satisfactory remuneration" is enough. Psychological and situational context in corporate governance is also considered in both agency theory and stewardship theory.
In agency theory, the psychological factor (i.e. motivation) is a result of fi nancial needs. However, in stewardship theory, higher level needs (progress, achievements, self-actualization) are the source of motivation.
The situational factors in stewardship theory are: trust, engagement, collectivism and low power distance. In contrast, in the agency theory these factors are: control mechanisms, individualism, and high power distance. control's team) and the management (the management team). An opposite assumption comes from the theory of Steward, more recognized in corporate governance systems in Europe and Japan. It says that the confl ict of interests is always present, but it also emphasizes that the board members will always prioritize and take care of the interests of company, for the sake of their position in the market of managers and also because it determines the perspective of their further promotion and development. 
Conclusion
The concepts presented and analysed here show the models of functioning of corporate governance (modifi ed functions of the supervisory board, Agencies Theory, the Steward's Theory, closed model, open model, guidelines and standards of the OECD) indicate that there are an the attempts to modify the effi ciency of the supervisory boards (corporate governance). One could say that the current state of analysis and research on corporate governance does not allow for far-reaching proposals and guidelines leading to "optimal model" of corporate governance functioning, but it seems that these are necessary steps towards fi nding such a model.
